A response to Josh Chafetz' essay justifying his intended vote for Sen. Kerry

Josh Chafetz, writing in Oxblog, explains why he intends to vote for Sen. Kerry.  The whole post is well written and argued, and I commend it to you in its entirety.   Here's the first key paragraph on foreign policy/domestic security (italics in original):

First, I think that Kerry's foreign policy will be constrained in good ways. Path dependence is a very important political force. I'm not at all worried about Kerry's response to another attack -- no president could resist striking back hard, and I see no reason to think that Kerry would even want to resist striking back hard. Moreover, Kerry will not, I think, be able to pull out of Iraq any time soon. He will not, I think, be able to cut funding for programs designed to foster Arab civil society. (Indeed, Spencer Ackerman makes a good case that Kerry would be more devoted to civil society issues than Bush has been.) More importantly, I think the Bush Administration has been very good about getting the Arab world talking about liberal, democratic values. Now, I think, it would be good to have a President who is better able to put into place the concrete policies that will reinforce the broad foreign policy goals that, I think, the Bush Administration has done a good job of locking in. In other words, now that the Arab world is talking about democracy — the kind of talk that will grow and feed on itself and ultimately cannot be silenced — we can help by having a President who (a) is not reviled in the region, and (b) is a bit less incompetent at actually promoting our foreign policy objectives than the current administration has been. Yes, (a) means that some sort of "global test" is factoring into my vote. I'm not thrilled about that, but when the major issue in the campaign is foreign policy, it would, I think, be self-defeating not to take into account how the rest of the world views the candidates and whether the rest of the world will be willing to work well with the candidate. And (b), of course, is speculative. Perhaps Kerry wouldn't be better than Bush. But any election must largely be a referendum on the incumbent, and I am increasingly convinced that Bush has mismanaged too many important aspects of our foreign policy to be given my trust again.

I cannot but admire the eloquence here, but I'm unpersuaded.  Working backwards through the paragraph: 

• This is not a recall election, nor, with due respect, "largely" a referendum on the incumbent.  It is entirely a binary choice between two very different candidates, their respective political parties, and their worldviews.  (In fairness, Mr. Chafetz recognizes this fact at the conclusion of his post.)
• There's certainly anecdotal evidence that leaders and populaces in France, Germany, and Belgium prefer Sen. Kerry's "style," and find Dubya's off-putting.  But there's also anecdotal evidence that Sen. Kerry's insensitivity toward the allies who have stood by America is also off-putting, and Mr. Chafetz' argument seems to altogether ignore this — despite, for example, the recent election returns from Australia (charter member of the so-called phony coalition of the bought, bribed, coerced, and extorted).  Not everyone abroad "likes" Kerry better.
• Whether "style" is a net plus for either candidate, however, it's not what's most important.  Mr. Chafetz and his co-bloggers at Oxblog have normally been quite clear-eyed in their writings in recognizing that global alliances, at bottom, aren't about warm fuzzies, but instead about self-perceived national interests.  When national interests are considered, there's no reason to suspect — much less empirical evidence to support the premise that — any allies are likely to behave more positively on any substantive matter (i.e., perceive their own national interests differently) if Sen. Kerry's at the American helm.
• Finally, much of this paragraph, and the ones that precede it, give Dubya credit where due.  Even if Mr. Chafetz has fault to find in the Bush administration's performance in some respects, he ought also factor in that Dubya is a known quantity on fighting the war against terrorists aggressively.  By contrast, for every Kerry quote rattling a saber against terrorists, I can produce two or three that scream "wimp" and another that's in the mushy middle.  Quotes aside, Sen. Kerry's actions and votes throughout his adult history have been consistently, reflexively against the significant use of American force (with the bizarre, inexplicable exception of supporting Clinton in the Balkins).  Mr. Chafetz doesn't appear to have factored into his calculus any risk that "Kerry the Anti-Terrorist Hawk" is a campaign fiction; however one assesses that risk, it certainly isn't zero. 

Mr. Chafetz' next paragraph is also eloquent, with an argument I don't think I've previously seen made quite this concisely (italics in original):

I can envision a situation in which I think the United States ought to take military action and in which President Bush would agree, whereas President Kerry, because of his inordinate faith in the legitimizing power of international institutions, might not. But, first, let me note that, in any situation in which military force is clearly called for (e.g., another attack, leading to another Afghanistan), I have complete confidence that Kerry will make the right call. But what about another close call where I think we ought to send troops? It's true, Kerry might not make my preferred decision. But I am also convinced that Bush — even a reelected Bush — would lack the political capital to send American troops into battle again in a close call. In other words, in the primary situation in which Bush's advantage in grand strategy would be an issue, I don't think Bush would be able to put his preferred policy in place, anyway.

I agree that a second-term Dubya doesn't presently have the political capital to, say, invade Syria or Iran or North Korea.  Nor have diplomatic efforts yet been exhausted with respect to those state actors; nor does any of them have quite yet the decade of defiance of UN sanctions and international opinion that Saddam's Iraq had, or the decade-long daily history of shooting at American and British aircraft.  I don't understand Mr. Chafetz to be arguing that we should promptly go to war with any of those countries.  So looking at present levels of political capital, I submit, isn't relevant.  Instead, I'd submit that four different factors — all hypothetical and forward-looking — are what's presently relevant:

• Based on the perceptions of these potential future state-actor adversaries, which candidate's current credibility — in terms of perceived willingness to use military force when appropriate — is likely to influence, moderate, and restrain those states?  There's a compelling one-word proof that the answer to that question is Dubya, I think:  Libya.
• Which candidate, if elected, could rebuild the necessary domestic and international political capital, when and if circumstances change to the point at which Mr. Chafetz and I would agree, by a "close call," that military force is appropriate?  Again, my assumption is that in the international arena, decisionmakers will be motivated by their own perceived self-interests; but that perception includes, certainly, their subjective predictions as to whether the then-sitting American President has the courage, despite substantial domestic and international opposition, to stay the course once embarking on a military option.  Tony Blair and John Howard, for instance, have had their own struggles to maintain domestic support for their governments' support of America; but they haven't had to worry about Dubya going wobbly and sawing off the limbs they've advanced onto.  And domestically, the question is, who is more likely to be able to assemble and maintain a working majority to support the military option?  That question practically answers itself, as I think Mr. Chafetz would admit.
• I agree with Mr. Chafetz that if there is another 9/11-scale attack on America, a President Kerry would acquire the necessary domestic and international support to retaliate on a state actor that's as clearly tied to the attack as was Afghanistan's Taliban to 9/11.  But by definition, we're talking here about the "close calls."  What if there's another incident directed by a rogue state-actor at a crucial American ally — another event comparable to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait?  For example, Syria has a long history of military clashes with Israel.  Suppose it attempts to seize the Golan Heights and simultaneously decapitates the Israeli leadership through proxies' terrorist attacks?  Suppose North Korea stays on its side of the DMV, but decides to institute a 30-minute artillery barrage on Seoul one day each week?  Or what if there's an urgent need for American military action against nonstate actors being sheltered by a rogue state, or just a grumpy one?  Iran bears Israel no love, and could quite conceivably create a major international crisis there through terrorists it supports.  Or what if diplomacy and sanctions have failed, and based on the best and most credible intelligence available, it's go or no-go time on a pre-emptive military strike to take out Iran's nascent nuclear capabilities?  In any of these situations — whether you think they're improbable or not — are our options not broadened if there's a credible threat of American intervention, if necessary including ground troops?  I think they are — and I think there will be no such credible threat from a Kerry administration for any event short of another 9/11-scale attack directly on the US.  What would be "close calls" for a second-term Bush adminstration would become not at all close under a President Kerry, but default instead to American inaction and impotency.
• The last factor is probably the least important, but not insignificant.  It blinks reality to ignore the faith that our military forces have in their present Commander in Chief, and their disdain for Sen. Kerry as his prospective successor.  The reason I say this is the least important factor is that I have enormous confidence that those forces would, quite professionally, strive to overcome that disdain, as they did in the Clinton years.  But among the professional warrior caste, there is a fairly clear preference for whom they'd like to see lead them in our future conflicts, and it ought not count for nothing.

Kevin Drum, analyzing Mr. Chafetz' post, concludes:

For hawks, the best argument in favor of Kerry is that the Iraq war is a done deal, and there isn't likely to be a followup. So even if Bush was the right bull in a china shop for the past four years, is he also the best guy to put the china shop back together over the next four? Probably not.

With due respect to Mr. Drum, that's a silly metaphor.  The world over the next four years isn't going to be a china shop, and there are likely to be new and even more serious challenges than putting broken china back together (I assume he's talking about reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq).  Mr. Drum seems blind to those possibilities; I regret to say that his anybody-but-Bush instincts have completely overwhelmed him.  He's not susceptible to rational argument on foreign policy/security issues any more.

But Mr. Chafetz is probably the sort of thoughtful, non-moonbat center-left patriot to whom my "Can John Kerry do what LBJ couldn't?" post earlier this week was directed.  Indeed, his co-blogger David Adesnik, who's also voting for Sen. Kerry, was kind enough to link and comment on that post.  Mr. Chafetz and Mr. Adesnik clearly recognize the risks that a Kerry Presidency would mean a less effective America in the worldwide fight against terrorists and terrorism.  I think, however, that they've used their formidable rhetorical skills to talk themselves into taking that risk, and they've unwittingly blinded themselves to their own heavy thumbs on their intellectual scales.

If Sen. Kerry wins, I'll join Mr. Chafetz and Mr. Adesnik in hoping that their gamble pays off.  Unfortunately, I think a President Kerry would badly need a coalition of folks like us, on one side or the other of the center, because the Kevin Drums-and-leftwards-of-him folks from his own party will never, ever support the use, or even a credible threat of the use, of military force in any situation less dramatic than another 9/11-scale attack.  I think it's a bad gamble.  There will be crises in the next four years; a hand on the American helm that's even perceived as unsteady will encourage such crises, in much the same way that a preceivedly wishy-washy John Kennedy, post-Bay of Pigs, encouraged Soviet adventurism that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

And truth be told, I think a President Kerry is more likely to end up somewhere to even Kevin Drum's left — based on the man's history, which so conflicts with his current campaign words.  In that case, the question of a working coalition from the center-left working rightward is going to be a moot question.  I'd say that a Kerry administration will be Carter redux — except that comparison is unfair, I think, to Carter.  I'm afraid that I'd find myself longing for the comparatively steadfast and  aggressive foreign policy of Bill Clinton — who could, at least, wag the dog vigorously, albeit largely ineffectively, on occasion.